As one year passes since the explosion, the case for such an international investigation has only strengthened. The Human Rights Council HRC has the opportunity to assist Lebanon to meet its human rights obligations by mandating an investigative mission into the August 4, explosion to identify the causes of, and responsibility for, the blast, and what steps need to be taken to ensure an effective remedy for victims.
It should also identify failures in the domestic investigation of the blast that would constitute a violation of the right to an effective remedy and the right to life. It should make recommendations on measures necessary to guarantee that the authors of these violations and abuses, regardless of their affiliation or seniority, are held accountable for their acts and to address the underlying systemic failures that led to the explosion and to the limited scope of the domestic investigation.
The independent investigative mission should report on the other human rights impaired or violated by the explosion and failures by the Lebanese authorities and make recommendations to Lebanon and the international community on steps that are needed both to remedy the violations and to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.
In addition, countries with Global Magnitsky and other human rights and corruption sanction regimes should sanction officials implicated in ongoing violations of human rights related to the August 4 blast and efforts to undermine accountability.
Human Rights Watch has compiled over documents related to the Rhosus and its cargo, some of which have not been published before See Annex 2 and English translations in Annex 3. These include documents sent to and from officials working under the Ministry of Finance, including customs officials; the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, including port officials; members of the judiciary; the Case Authority a body at the Ministry of Justice that acts as the legal representative of the Lebanese state in judicial proceedings ; members of the Higher Defense Council; General Security; State Security; and others.
These documents were obtained via open-source research and from the investigative unit at Al-Jadeed television, the Samir Kassir Foundation, and six confidential sources.
Human Rights Watch wrote to 43 Lebanese government officials and six political parties regarding the role that they and their institutions played in the August 4, explosion and to eight companies and two law firms to request information pertaining to the Rhosus and its cargo and their work see Annex 4. Six officials, one company, and one law firm responded to our correspondence on the record before publication and their responses have been incorporated into this report see Annex 5.
For this report, Human Rights Watch also conducted ten interviews with Lebanese government, security, and judicial officials, including the caretaker prime minister, the director general of State Security, and the former head of the Case Authority.
Most interviews were conducted in person, but some were conducted over the phone. Researchers informed all interviewees about the purpose and voluntary nature of the interviews and the ways in which Human Rights Watch would use the information and obtained consent from all interviewees.
Human Rights Watch has withheld the names of some individuals featured in the report at their request. Interviews were conducted in Arabic or English without the assistance of a translator. By default, the port became part of the state under the Port Authority, but it was operating without an institutional framework, which led to a scathing critique by the World Bank when it wrote:.
Reinoud Leenders, a researcher who has written a book about corruption and state building in post-war Lebanon, aptly explained how this structure is problematic:. Bribery and petty crime have been rife at the port. Over the years, Kobeissi has filmed several customs officials alleging that they regularly receive bribes or actually receiving bribes, including in return for turning a blind eye to errors in declaration forms or circumventing the customs risk software, which determines the clearance track and levels of scrutiny over the goods.
The mismanagement and corruption at the port has not only enriched party loyalists and others at the expense of the state, but it has also allowed illicit and dangerous goods to enter the country undetected. A former shipping company employee described to Human Rights Watch the security vacuum and web of bribery at the port that allows for dangerous goods to enter or leave the country without any monitoring. He said that companies or individuals who want to bring in any type of goods, including prohibited goods, can do so if they pay customs officials enough.
He underscored that the state rarely, if ever, apprehends those goods. The Lebanese General Directorate of State Security, which is an arm of the Higher Defense Council chaired by the president, established an office at the port in April tasked with fighting corruption there. Several major political parties in Lebanon have acknowledged the massive scale of corruption at the port, and particularly by customs, and blamed the state for failing to address it.
Daher has been charged for his role in the August 4, explosion and has been in detention since August In addition, despite promising to stamp out corruption at the port, the Minister of Finance between and , Ali Hassan Khalil, a member of the Amal Movement, was sanctioned by the United States government for alleged material support to Hezbollah, including through corruption.
In September , the US government also sanctioned Youssef Fenianos, a member of the Marada Movement, who was the Minister of Public Works and Transport between and , for alleged material support to Hezbollah, including through corruption. The general inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption, and political malfeasance that has plagued the Beirut port for decades all contributed to the devastating blast there on August 4, In fact, the Rhosus was rented to transport an estimated tonnes of seismic equipment when it was already overloaded and not equipped to do so.
The identity of the actual owners of the ship has also been in question. The Rhosus arrived in Beirut carrying 2, tonnes of high-density ammonium nitrate.
The seismic survey equipment that the Rhosus was supposed to load in Beirut was in Lebanon as a result of a contract between Spectrum, a UK company, and then-Minister of Energy and Water Gebran Bassil.
Cogic Consultants wanted to move the equipment it had used during the oil and gas exploration missions for the minister back to Jordan, since the equipment was owned by GSC.
The Spectrum employee who is reported to have signed the contract with Minister Bassil told the media that Spectrum subcontracted the movement of machinery. Human Rights Watch wrote to each of the companies involved to ask whether they selected the ship to transport the seismic equipment to Jordan, and if so, on what basis they made the selection but did not receive any on the record responses.
While Savaro Limited is registered as a chemical trading company in the UK, in January , investigative journalist Firas Hatoum revealed that it was a shell company, and that the company shared a London address with other companies linked to two Syrian-Russian businessmen who have been sanctioned by the US government for acting on behalf of the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad.
Two British lawmakers called for the company to be investigated in early , after a media investigation revealed that the beneficial owner registered with the government was acting as an agent for the ultimate beneficial owner who had not been disclosed.
Human Rights Watch wrote to Savaro Limited on July 8 and asked about its ownership, scope of business, relationship to the 2, tonnes of high-density ammonium nitrate on board the Rhosus , and what actions it took to retrieve its cargo. The company did not respond to the correspondence prior to publication. Human Rights Watch was unable to verify the authenticity of the documents before this report went to publication.
FBME was sanctioned, in part, for allegedly facilitating the activities of international terrorist financiers, including for Hezbollah, and for having a customer that was a front company for a US-sanctioned Syrian entity, which was designated as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, some experts have called into question whether there were 2, tonnes of ammonium nitrate in hangar 12 when it exploded on August 4, , estimating that the amount that remained in the hangar at the time of the explosion may have been , tons. Ships carrying freight are issued a bill of lading, which is an official document between the shipper and the carrier that includes details of the shipment itself.
In its response to the Manifest Department on February 28, , the agency claimed that as far as they knew, the Unified List only had to mention the quantity, weight, and destination country of the cargo and requested an exemption from the violation.
On April 22, , based on the information above, the head of the Manifest Department at the time, Badri Daher, recommended excusing the violation of not identifying the type of cargo on the Unified List, saying it was correctly identified on the transit manifest.
However, it is not clear on what basis Diab identified the nitrogen content of the ammonium nitrate as being below Under the Customs Law, restricted merchandise is not allowed to be imported or exported without a license, permit, or special approval issued by a competent authority, which lifts the restriction on this merchandise, and any such merchandise without the relevant permits must be treated like prohibited goods and should be seized.
The Lebanese army is responsible for giving prior approval for importing military equipment and ammunition, including ammonium nitrate with a nitrogen grade above Official responsibility for the Beirut port is shared between the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, which oversees the Port Authority, and the Ministry of Finance, which oversees the Customs Administration.
Within customs, two parallel institutions govern: the Higher Council for Customs and the General Directorate of Customs. In addition, a range of security services are also present at the port with overlapping mandates, including from the Lebanese Armed Forces Military Intelligence , State Security, General Security, and customs. This section reviews the decisions and often, inaction of government officials concerning the Rhosus and its cargo between February and the explosion on August 4, , breaking down the actions of each government ministry or agency operating in the Beirut port.
Neither they, or any security agency operating in the port, took adequate steps to secure the material or establish an adequate emergency response plan or precautionary measures, should a fire break out in the port. Representatives of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport were warned about the serious danger presented by the ammonium nitrate, yet failed to investigate the threat the material posed and mischaracterized what they were told about the danger in their communications with the Case Authority.
It acts as the legal representative of the Lebanese State in all judicial and administrative proceedings, with the Minister of Justice assigning judges and lawyers to assist the judge presiding over the Case Authority. After the cargo was offloaded, the ministry continued to misrepresent the danger it posed.
Further, ministry officials failed to properly execute a June 27, judicial ruling to store the ammonium nitrate in a suitable place and to take the necessary precautions in doing so.
Instead, they knowingly stored the ammonium nitrate in hangar 12 alongside flammable or explosive materials for nearly six years in a poorly secured and ventilated hangar in the middle of a densely populated commercial and residential area. They also failed to take adequate steps to secure the material or establish an adequate emergency response plan or precautionary measures should a fire break out in the port. All of the actions taken by ministry officials appear to have been limited to seeking court approval to sell or re-export the ammonium nitrate and appear to have excluded measures they could have taken to store the dangerous material in a secure manner.
Some of the information provided by the firm incorrectly described the risks posed by the cargo. Ammonium nitrate is non flammable, but it can cause combustible materials to ignite, and under extreme conditions of heat and pressure in a confined space it will explode.
On July 8, , Human Rights Watch wrote to Baroudi and Associates asking how they first became aware of the ammonium nitrate on board the Rhosus and the dangers that the cargo posed. Baroudi and Associates responded on July 12, , saying that they are legally prohibited from answering the questions.
Further, the Beirut harbor master, Mohammad al-Mawla, sent two letters in , one of which was addressed directly to Abdel Hafiz al-Kaissi, director general of Land and Maritime Transport, warning that the ammonium nitrate on board the Rhosus was hazardous and that the ship was at risk of sinking, and requesting further instructions on how to proceed.
Correspondence between Baroudi and Associates, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Case Authority, and a Beirut judge of urgent matters, suggests that the ministry did not undertake any investigation into the danger posed by the ammonium nitrate, and instead shared only a portion of the information they received with the Case Authority that implied that the risk the material posed would be neutralized if it were offloaded from the ship.
Even after the cargo was offloaded, the ministry continued to incorrectly represent the dangers presented by the material. After receiving the April 7, letter from Baroudi and Associates Law Firm, al-Kaissi responded on April 17, fully reciting the risks identified by the firm.
On June 2, , he writes that if the ship sinks, it could cause an explosion due to the hazardous material on board. On April 2, , the Ship Inspection Service staff under the Directorate General of Land and Maritime Transport , had inspected the Rhosus and concluded conditions on the ship had deteriorated and it was at risk of sinking.
Captain Haitham Chaaban of the Inspection Services recommended the ship leave Lebanese waters, noting it was a hazard for the safety of maritime navigation and a water pollution risk. He noted the cargo was dangerous and could potentially cause a chemical reaction, could expire, or could leak into the sea. On June 2, al-Kaissi reiterated the urgency of the request to sell the ship to the Case Authority, noting the dangers of it sinking but once again failing to mention other risks posed by the material, including that it is potentially explosive and combustible and that it can be used to make explosives.
He appointed the court's clerk to enforce the ruling. The cargo was offloaded into hangar 12 in the port in October After the cargo was offloaded, correspondence between the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and the Case Authority continued to mischaracterize the threat posed by the ammonium nitrate. Zeaiter was informed about the ammonium nitrate on at least two occasions. As minister, Fenianos sent letters to the Case Authority regarding the ammonium nitrate at the port on December 18, , March 5, , and September 12, , asking the Case Authority to ask the Enforcement Department to take the necessary steps to sell the ship and cargo or re-export the materials.
The letters reference the danger posed by the sinking ship to maritime navigation correspondence from the minister on March 5, reflects that the Rhosus did sink on February 18, , public safety, and the environment, but are silent on the dangers posed by the ammonium nitrate stored in hangar After the August 4, explosion, Fenianos said he personally signed eight letters regarding the ammonium nitrate and the Directorate General of Land and Maritime Transport sent another eight.
Human Rights Watch also wrote to Fenianos to request copies of the letters he referenced but did not receive a response prior to publication. Michel Najjar, the Minister of Public Works and Transport at the time of the blast, said in the days following the blast that he learned that since , the ministry had sent at least 18 letters to the Beirut judge of urgent matters asking that the ammonium nitrate be disposed of.
He did not respond to the correspondence prior to publication. Journalists from the local television station Al-Jadeed presented evidence that an advisor to Najjar removed documents from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport on August 9, , the Sunday following the blast. Najjar and his advisor gave conflicting accounts of what those documents were on live television. The judge appointed the court's clerk to enforce the ruling in his June 27, decision. Following the judicial decision, on September 3, , in a letter addressed to the port authority, Al-Kaissi requests the assignment of a location for the cargo to be stored.
Al-Kaissi wrote that the material was hazardous, but did not specify the dangers posed by the ammonium nitrate. However, al-Mawla signed with reservations, stating that he has no authority over the warehouses, as they are under the authority of the customs administration and the port authority. Hangar 12 is a warehouse designated for hazardous and flammable materials. At the time of the explosion, the ammonium nitrate was reportedly stored alongside kerosene, hydrochloric acid, 23 tons of fireworks, 50 tons of ammonium phosphate, and 5 rolls of slow burning detonating cord, among other items.
The national regulations of several countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United Sates, concerning ammonium nitrate storage and handling requirements, also prohibit the storing of explosive and combustible material in proximity to ammonium nitrate.
AMAT guidance states that ammonium nitrate stacks should be no more than two meters high and three meters wide, and there should be at least one-meter-wide aisles between the ammonium nitrate stacks and between the stack and the walls of the storage building.
International guidance on safe storage and handling of ammonium nitrate also calls for authorities to develop an appropriate emergency response plan and safety precautions, should a fire break out in the port. The danger of storing ammonium nitrate in hangar 12 at the port was immediately clear. Under the Lebanese Harbors and Ports Regulations, Harbor Masters have a duty to monitor dangerous goods on ships and in docks and to take the measures necessary to preserve public safety.
Nearly all of the actions taken by ministry officials appear to have been limited to trying to get a judicial decision to sell or re-export the ammonium nitrate and appear to have excluded measures they could have unilaterally taken to safely store or secure the material. An internal Port Authority memo obtained by Human Rights Watch from January reflects that port officials could prepare lists of abandoned goods for consideration of removal and destruction by customs, including goods abandoned in port warehouses for longer than six months.
Instead, months later, in March , al-Kaissi requested that the College of Industrial Studies inspect and analyze the nature of the goods and determine whether they could be disposed of in Lebanon or elsewhere, and at what cost.
When the judge of urgent matters summoned the ministry and the maritime agent of the Rhosus to a session on September 16, , to discuss the repeated requests to sell or re-export the ammonium nitrate, the Case Authority-appointed lawyer representing the ministry and the agent reportedly did not attend.
Efforts by the ministry to sell or re-export the ammonium nitrate appear to have lapsed for some time. After Youssef Fenianos took office as minister in , he resumed them. In letters Fenianos sent to the Case Authority regarding the ammonium nitrate at the port on December 18, , March 5, , and September 12, , he asked the Case Authority to ask the Enforcement Department to take the necessary steps to sell the ship and cargo or re-export the materials.
Continuing to act on behalf of the ministry to sell the ship and ammonium nitrate or re-export the cargo, the lawyer appointed by the Case Authority made at least two additional requests to the judge of urgent matters in Beirut, on July 20, and February 15, , to authorize the sale of the ship and the cargo or compel the maritime agent to re-export the cargo, despite the rejection of earlier requests for lack of jurisdiction.
Despite its repeated, years-long attempts to get approval to sell the ship and its cargo, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport refused to pay the expert in advance, as stipulated by the Enforcement Department. Al-Kaissi, Koraytem, and al-Mawla have all been charged by the judicial investigator responsible for the investigation into the August 4 explosion.
Ghazi Zeaiter and Yousef Fenianos were also charged by Judge Fadi Sawan, the initial judicial investigator, with criminal negligence that led to the blast on December 10, Zeaiter refused to appear before Sawan for questioning as a suspect.
My conscience is clear and I will therefore meet the judge to tell him he violated article 40, 70, and 71 of the constitution. However, Fenianos refused to submit to questioning in February after being contacted by telephone by the Central Criminal Investigation Department, saying that the notification was a violation of criminal procedure.
Official correspondence between customs officials, who operate under the Ministry of Finance, and to and from customs officials and other official entities, reflects that a range of officials, including up to the then-Minister of Finance, Ali Hassan Khalil, were informed of the dangers posed by the ammonium nitrate in hangar It also reveals that they failed to take the necessary actions within their power and responsibility to remove the threat.
The steps Ministry of Finance officials took to sell or re-export the ammonium nitrate were procedurally incorrect, but they persisted in these same incorrect steps despite repeatedly being told this by urgent matters judges. All the legal experts and judicial sources with whom Human Rights Watch spoke said that the Customs Administration did not need judicial authorization to sell, re-export, or destroy the material, but one said that whether or not the Customs Administration could have done this without removing the judicial guardianship over the material was still under study.
In all cases, however, removing the judicial guardianship over the material was a straightforward measure that any judge of urgent matters could have taken, but the Customs Administration never requested that a judge do so. Customs officials were first warned of the dangers posed by the ammonium nitrate on February 21, The letter also lists the Head of Central Station as someone to whom it should be referred, but the copy of the letter obtained by Human Rights Watch does not have his signature on it.
In a phone call with Human Rights Watch, Ibrahim Shamseddine confirmed that he was the Head of Central Station at the time when the letter was sent, but he denied ever receiving a letter from Joseph Skaf. The danger that the ammonium nitrate in hangar 12 posed was also articulated by Nehme Brax, the head of the Manifest Department at the port, shortly after it was moved off the ship in October All of the known interventions of the two customs directors between and appear to be aimed at asking the judge of urgent matters to either sell or re-export the ammonium nitrate in hangar In making these requests, they both repeatedly ignored judicial decisions from the urgent matters judges.
They also failed to take other actions they could have to unilaterally eliminate or mitigate the risks presented by the ammonium nitrate at the port. Between December 5, and December 28, , customs directors sent at least six letters to urgent matters judges requesting they re-export or sell the ammonium nitrate. From to the letters were sent from Shafik Merhi, the then customs director. The letters were sent by Badri Daher, who was appointed as director general of Customs in March In each case, following receipt of a letter from the customs directors requesting the goods be re-exported or sold, the urgent matters judges returned the letters on procedural grounds; referred them to the Case Authority, in some cases, requesting that the Case Authority assess whether the court of urgent matters was authorized to look into the matter; or noted they did not have jurisdiction to approve the sale or re-export of the material.
Procedurally, customs did not log their requests in the registrar of the court as provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, but sent the communications by mail. In addition to the procedural errors, judicial sources told Human Rights Watch that the urgent matters judges could not have authorized the sale or re-export of the material, as they can only take temporary measures in urgent situations and are not empowered to issue permanent rulings, like deciding on the ownership of the material, that would touch on the fundamentals of entitlements.
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Find your travel time to estimate the length of a flight between airports, or ask how long it takes to fly from one city to another. Click here to show map. Yet I think that in the context of a larger trip to Lebanon and the broader Middle East, Lebanon is definitely worth at least a few days of your time.
This is part of why I think 3 days in Beirut is the perfect amount of time to spend. At the same time, the level of personal safety in Beirut is very high. Beirut is affordable in some ways, and overpriced in others. I find that hotels and higher-end restaurants here can be expensive, while street food and sit-down meals for local restaurants are much cheaper. If you only visit Beirut during your trip to Lebanon, then I obviously think three days is a fair amount of time to spend.
As the world finally escapes from the throes of Covid, 3 days in Beirut is just what the doctor ordered.
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